I use the Prescott (1975) hotels model to explain variations in price dispersion across goods sold by supermarkets in Chicago. I extend the theory to accounts for the monopoly power of chains and for non-shoppers. The main empirical finding is that the effect of demand uncertainty on price dispersion is highly significant and quantitatively important: More than 50% of the cross sectional standard deviation of log prices is due to demand uncertainty. I also find that price dispersion measures are negatively correlated with the average price but are not negatively correlated with the revenues from selling the good (across stores and weeks) and with the number of stores that sell the good.
INTRODUCTION
Deviations from the law of one price are a challenge for the understanding of market-based economies. Among the explanation proposed are price discrimination, search frictions and sticky prices. Here I use scanner data on supermarket prices in Chicago to study the role of aggregate demand uncertainty.
I find that on average, more than 50% of the cross sectional standard deviation of log prices is due to demand uncertainty. This finding is consistent with Prescott (1975) type models that focus on demand uncertainty as the reason for price dispersion. 1 The original Prescott (1975) model assumed that prices are set in advance and cheaper goods are sold first. In Eden (1990) I relax the price rigidity assumption and describe a sequential trade process in which cheaper goods are sold first. In this model, that I call the Uncertain and Sequential Trade (UST) model, buyers arrive at the market place sequentially. Each buyer sees all available offers, buys at the cheapest available price and disappears. Sellers must make irreversible selling decisions before they know the aggregate state of demand and in equilibrium they are indifferent between prices that are in the equilibrium range because the selling probability is lower for higher prices. Sellers in the model make time consistent plans 1 There is no uncertainty about aggregate demand in search models of price dispersion and therefore getting price dispersion in search models is a challenge. Diamond (1971) was the first to point out the difficulty. In his model the equilibrium price distribution is degenerate and all firms post the monopoly price. Diamond assumed that buyers sample one firm at a time. Burdett and Judd (1983) allowed for sampling more than one selling offer per period and show that price dispersion will arise if the probability of sampling more than one seller is between zero and one. If however the probability of sampling more than one seller goes to one we will converge to a single price equilibrium in which all firms post the competitive price. If the probability of sampling more than one seller goes to zero we will converge to a single price equilibrium in which all firms post the monopoly price (as in the Diamond model). For other search models of price dispersion, see Reinganum (1979) , Rob (1985) and Stahl (1989). and do not have an incentive to change prices during the trading process. Prices are thus completely flexible. 2 To adapt the model to the market for food I attempt two extensions of the standard UST model. I consider the case in which there are chains with limited monopoly power and attempt a distinction between shoppers and non-shoppers.
The first extension assumes that stores that post the same price belong to the same chain. This leads to an interesting formula for price dispersion. The range measure of price dispersion is decreasing in monopoly power and increasing in discrimination power and demand uncertainty. The second extension assumes that all buyers are informed about posted prices in each store. Non-shoppers visit one store only and choose this store on the basis of its posted price and other store characteristics. Shoppers visit many stores and buy the good at the cheapest available price. These extensions do not change the main prediction about the relationship between aggregate demand uncertainty and price dispersion and thus demonstrate its robustness.
I use a large weekly data set from Information Resources, Inc. (IRI) on supermarket prices. The choice of this data set seems natural for studying the role of demand uncertainty. The advantages of using food prices are: (a) food is an important part of the household's budget and most people buy food every week; (b) the price of food is a relatively simple "contract"; (c) price discrimination does not seem an important reason for price dispersion in food items. The IRI data set used here is a natural choice because the weekly frequency allows for a narrow definition of the good and (unlike the Dominick's data set) stores in this data set belong to different chains. I now elaborate on some of these points. 2 There are versions of the Prescott model that assume price rigidity. See for example, Dana (1998 Dana ( , 1999 and Deneckere and Peck (2012) . For the positive implications of the theory it does not matter whether a flexible price or a rigid price version of the model is employed. But sometimes the rigid price versions of the Prescott model tends to be lumped together with menu costs models that have very different empirical implications. See Eden (2001) and Baharad and Eden (2004) .
The studies of price dispersion attempt to compare the price of the same good across stores. Having a narrow definition of the good is therefore of critical importance. Goods may be different across three dimensions: physical characteristics, time of purchase and the services provided by the store that sells the good. Since the aim is to compare goods across stores the first two dimensions deserve special attention. The IRI data set rank high on these two dimensions. It is a weekly data set with the narrowest possible definition of the physical characteristic of the good. It is also a very large data set.
A large data set with a narrow (week-UPC) good definition is hard to find.
Typically studies face a tradeoff between the narrowness of the good definition and the number of goods that they can include in the sample. For example, Lach (2002) used Israeli CPI monthly data. He reviewed the list of products in the Israeli CPI and found 31 products with precise labels. Out of these 31 products he chose 5
(refrigerator and 4 food items) that had also a weight measure. Kaplan and Menzio (2014) use the Kilts-Nielsen data set that tracks the shopping for food behavior of approximately 50,000 households. They define a good by its bar code and the quarter that it was sold. This is a narrow definition of the good but not as narrow as our week-UPC definition. Their study focuses on characterizing the typical price distribution and the characteristics of the households who get cheap deals on average. Here the focus is on the role of aggregate demand uncertainty.
The tradeoff between the narrowness of the good definition and the sample size is also present in studies of price dispersion in the airline industry. Escobari (2012) collected data on ticket prices for 81 flights (route-date combinations). Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) and Cornia, Gerardi and Shapiro (2012) use large publicly available data set on airline tickets (the DB1B data set) but unlike Escobari's data, a flight is a route-quarter combination.
Unlike airline tickets, food prices are easy to interpret. Two airline tickets may have different prices because one has a refund option and the other does not. Similarly the price of a hotel room may be different because one hotel promises a better cancellation policy. The refund or cancellation policy is important when studying the role of aggregate demand uncertainty because the question of who pays for an "empty seat" or an "empty hotel room" is central to the investigation.
Finally, the difference in cross sectional price dispersion across food item is not likely to emerge as a result of price discrimination because people who buy say milk also buy hotdogs. This is different from the case of the airline industry where it is often argued that buyers who purchase tickets close to the departure date are business travelers with relatively inelastic demand. As a result, in the airline industry it is difficult to distinguish between the demand uncertainty and the price discrimination models of price dispersion.
Section 2 is about the underlying theory. Section 3 discusses implementation issues. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 is the estimation results. Section 6 is a robustness checks. Section 7 assesses the quantitative importance of demand uncertainty. Concluding remarks are in the last section.
THEORY
I start with a simplified version of Bental and Eden (1993) and derive a relationship between specific measures of price dispersion and specific measures of demand uncertainty. For exposition see Eden (2005, ch. 14 
Sellers
The economy lasts forever. There are many goods and many sellers who can produce the goods at a constant unit cost. The unit cost of producing good j is λ j . Production occurs at the beginning of each period before the beginning of trade. The seller knows the distribution of demand but at the time of production he does not know the realization.
Selling is uncertain. The representative seller faces a tradeoff between the probability of making a sale and the price: The lower the price, the higher is the probability of making a sale. In each period, sellers of good j have to choose between Z j price tags: P 1 j < ... < P Zj . Posted prices do not change over time and therefore I drop the time index. I also drop the good index and consider a good with
The seller takes the probability that he can sell at each of the Z prices as
given. The probability of making a sale at the price P i is q i , where
Goods that are not sold are carried as inventories to the next period. A unit stored can be used to reduce production next period and the value of a unit of inventories is therefore βλ , where 0 < β < 1 reflects the cost of delay, storage cost and depreciation.
Sellers will post the price P i on a strictly positive and finite number of units only if:
(1)
The arbitrage condition (1) is key. The left hand side of (1) is the expected revenues from putting the price tag P i on one unit. With probability q i the seller will get the quoted price and with probability 1− q i he will get the value of inventories. The right hand side is the unit production cost. The seller will put the price tag P i on 0 < x < ∞ 4 There is no incentive in equilibrium to announce a price P i < p < P i+1 because the probability of making a sale at this price is the same as the probability of making a sale at the price P i+1 .
units, only if the two are equal. Otherwise, if q i P i + (1− q i )βλ > λ he will put the price tag on infinitely many units and if q i P i + (1− q i )βλ < λ he will not put the price tag on any unit.
Buyers
Buyers arrive at the market place after sellers have already made their production decisions. Upon arrival they see all available offers and each buyer buys one unit at the cheapest available price. (Thus buyers' reservation price is sufficiently high).
The number of active buyers that arrive in the market place in a typical period ( ! N ) is an iid discrete random variable that may take Z realizations:
. For notational convenience I use N 0 = 0 . All realizations occur with equal probabilities: State s occurs when ! N = N s with probability π = 1 Z . The difference between two consecutive realizations is denoted by:
Buyers arrive in a sequential manner. The first batch of Δ 1 buyers buys in the first market at the price P 1 . If s = 1 and no more buyers arrive trade is over for the period. If s > 1 an additional batch of Δ 2 buyers arrive and buys in the second market at the price P 2 . Again, if s = 2 no more buyers arrive and trade is over for the period.
Otherwise, if s > 2 a third batch arrives and buys in the third market at the price P 3 and so on.
It is useful to think of Z hypothetical markets that open sequentially. When The goods allocated to the last Z − s markets are not sold and are carried as inventories to the next period.
Equilibrium
Using x i to denote the supply to hypothetical market i , I define equilibrium as follows.
Equilibrium is a vector of prices (P 1 ,..., P Z ) , a vector of probabilities (q 1 ,..., q Z ) and a vector of supplies (x 1 ,..., x Z ) such that (a) the probability that market i will open and goods with price tag P i will be sold is:
arbitrage condition (1) is satisfied and (c) the supply to market i is equal to the potential demand:
Thus in equilibrium markets that open are cleared. Note that we may describe sellers in this model as "contingent price takers". They assume that they can sell any amount at the price P i if market i opens. Note also that production in each period is is a constant equal to the ratio of the average supply per market to the first market's supply. Note that α = 1 when the number of buyers is uniformly distributed, but may be different from one if the distribution is not uniform.
I now turn to the relationship between price dispersion and Z . I use (1) to get:
Since the probability that all the Z markets will open is q Z = π , in any given week the highest price is:
Since the probability that the first market will open is 1, the lowest price in any given week is:
Dividing (4) by (5) leads to:
where the last equality uses π = 1 Z . Using ( 1 α )HLU as an estimate for Z leads to:
HLU which is equivalent to:
Using ln(HLP) as a proxy for HLP − 1 and ln(HLU ) − ln(α ) as a proxy for HLU α − 1 leads to:
We have thus derived a linear relationship between the range measure of price dispersion, ln(HLP) , and the range measure of unit dispersion, ln(HLU ) . In what follows I attempt to generalize the above simple case.
Downward sloping demand
I now allow for the case in which each buyer has a downward sloping demand curve so that at the price P he buys D(P) units. This case analyzed in Eden (1990) , captures some aspect of storage behavior on the part of the buyers as in Pesendorfer (2002) and Hendel and Nevo (2013) . A buyer who arrives early will face a low price and will buy a relatively large quantity. Part of it he will consume in the same week and the rest he will store and consume in weeks that he arrives late and face a relatively high price.
To see that the relationship between the two measures of dispersion is robust to allowing for a downward sloping demand note that the quantity sold when ! N = N Z is:
Therefore (2) holds after modifying the constant to equal α = X X 1
. Equation (1) depends only on the probability that the hypothetical market will open and not on the amount sold. Since (8) is derived from (1) and (2), it holds also for this case.
In Eden (2013) I allow for heterogeneity among buyers. This case is relevant because the demand of the buyer depends on the amount of storage he has. I think that the relationship between price dispersion and unit dispersion will survive also this extension but I have not worked it out.
Cost shocks I now allow for cost shocks. I assume that at the time the seller makes the production decisions in week t , he knows the unit cost for this period, λ t , and the distribution of the unit cost next period. The next period's cost is a random variable, ! λ t+1 , and its expected value is denoted by:
. Since a unit of inventories can be used to cut next period's production, the value of inventories is the expected discounted cost in the next period, βλ t+1 e . We can therefore modify the arbitrage condition (1) as follows.
(9)
, we can write (9) as:
which leads to:
Taking the average of (11) over weeks and assuming that the average of ψ t over weeks is approximately 1 leads to a relationship that is similar to (8). 5 The required modification is that now we should compute HLP as the average ratio of the highest to lowest price over weeks.
The standard deviation measures
To derive a relationship between the standard deviation measures of dispersion, I
employ some additional assumptions. I assume that the number of buyers is the same across batches and Δ s = x for all s = 1,..., Z . As a result the fraction of stores that post the price P s is the same for all s and is given by π = x Zx = 1 Z . The probability of making a sale at the price P s is:
Under these assumptions (3) implies:
Since for the same good λ and Z are constants, the variance of the log of price is:
The number of units sold in state s is: U s = sx . Since x is a constant, the variance of the log of units is Var(ln s) and is equal to (13). Thus in this example there is a correlation between the standard deviation dispersion measures. The correlation is perfect when storage is not possible and β = 0 .
The theory up to now was rather abstract, but it is sufficient to describe the empirical findings. A reader who is mostly interested in the empirical findings can therefore jump to the implementation section. But some readers are not comfortable with this level of abstraction and would like to see a model that is more closely related to grocery stores. In an attempt to get a better fit between the model and the industry, I now consider two extensions. In section 2.2, I relax the price taking assumption and allow for the existence of chains each specializing in one of our hypothetical markets. In section 2.3, I distinguish between shoppers and nonshoppers. The relationship between price dispersion and demand uncertainty survives these extensions.
Chains with monopoly power
Grocery stores typically belong to chains. Here I assume that all stores that post the same price belong to the same chain and the chain has a monopoly power in one of our hypothetical markets. I use the last section in Eden (1990) and the example in Dana (1999) but here the monopoly power is limited to one hypothetical market.
As before, I assume that the number of active buyers ! N is an iid random variable and that the number of buyers that arrives in batch i is:
further that the reservation prices of buyers that arrive in batch i is distributed uniformly on the interval [0,a i ] and at the price P i ≤ a i , a fraction
a of the buyers that arrive in batch i will not buy the good.
I assume that a i ≥ a i−1 so that buyers who arrive late have on average higher reservation price. This assumption is consistent with the assumption made in studies of the airline industry where it is typically assumed that buyers who buy tickets close to the departure date are business travelers with relatively high reservation prices.
The amount sold in hypothetical market i (at the price P i ≤ a i ) is:
The inverse demand function in market i is therefore:
The chain chooses the supply to hypothetical market i ( x i ) by solving the following problem:
The solution to this problem is:
Substituting (17) in (15) leads to:
We can write the problem (16) as:
The term (a i − b i x i )x i is total revenues. The first order condition for this problem can therefore be written as marginal revenue = "unit cost", where the unit cost term, λ i
, is increasing in i (because the probability of sale, q i is decreasing in i ). We can therefore describe the solution to the problem (19) using the familiar diagram in Figure The lowest price is obtained by substituting q 1 = 1 in (18). This leads to: (18) leads to the highest price:
Dividing (21) by (20) leads to:
Substituting (2) in (22) and rearranging leads to:
Using the log approximation leads to:
Similar to (8) this is a linear relationship between price dispersion and unit dispersion.
Note that we can write (24) as:
Price dispersion therefore depends on the following three measures:
(a 1 − λ) / λ is a measure of monopoly power,
Note that price dispersion is decreasing in our measure of monopoly power, increasing in our measure of discrimination power and in our measure of demand uncertainty.
In the airline industry there is a problem in distinguishing empirically between monopoly power, discrimination power and demand uncertainty. 6 I do not see similar problems in this study of supermarket prices. Here I try to understand why for example the price dispersion of milk is lower than the price dispersion of hotdogs.
Buyers who buy milk are not different from buyers who buy hotdogs and since supermarkets that sell milk also sell hotdogs difference in the monopoly power does not seem important. We are thus forced to attribute the difference in price dispersion between milk and hotdogs to the difference in demand uncertainty.
Expected capacity utilization and price.
Expected capacity utilization is the ratio between the amount offered for sale and the average amount sold. In the previous sections a store that supplies x i units to market i sells on average q i x i units and its expected capacity utilization is:
A more general model that allows for non-shoppers may have a different expected capacity utilization expression. I now study the tradeoff between capacity utilization and price under the assumptions that (a) expected revenue per unit is a good proxy for expected profits and is the same across prices and (b) demand has two possible realizations. Assumption (a) holds when each store has one unit for sale and capacity is similar across stores. It also holds approximately when expected profits per unit is small. In Appendix A I consider the more general case in which stores maximize expected profits. 7
Store takes the expected capacity utilization in market i , ECU i , as given. At the lowest price P 1 everything is sold and ECU 1 = 1. The markup in the first market is:
I generalize (1) and assume that expected revenue per unit is the same across prices (hypothetical markets):
The left hand side of (1') is the expected per unit revenue when posting the price P i .
On average, a fraction ECU i of the unit is sold at P i . The remaining fraction of 1− ECU i is carried as inventories and is valued at βλ . Condition (1') says that the expected revenue from supplying a unit to the hypothetical market i is equal the revenue from supplying a unit to the first market. It leads to:
There is thus a tradeoff between average capacity utilization and price: A hypothetical market with a relatively low average capacity utilization ECU i has a relatively high price.
The ratio of the highest to the lowest price is:
7 Capacity utilization has been used to explain price dispersion in the airline industry. See Escobari and Li (2007) , Escobari (2012) and Escobari and Lee (2013) and Cornia, Gerardi and Shapiro (CGS, 2012). Escobari et al. focus on within flight correlation between price dispersion and capacity utilization: Flights that are relatively empty tend to have less price dispersion. CGS find a negative correlation between average capacity utilization and price dispersion: Routes with low average capacity utilization tend to have more price dispersion. In a previous version of this paper, I argue here that both observations are consistent with the UST model.
I now show that when demand has two possible realizations and Z = 2 , there is a positive relationship between HLP and HLU . When Z = 2 , aggregate expected capacity utilization is:
where π 1 is the probability of the low aggregate demand state, π 2 is the probability of the high aggregate demand state, L is the quantity sold in the low demand state and H is the quantity sold in the high demand state. AECU can also be written as a weighted average of the expected capacity utilization of the stores in the economy.
Let n i denote the number of stores in market i and let n = n 1 + n 2 denote the total number of stores. Since ECU 1 = 1, we have:
where the second equality uses (27) 
it follows that HLP is increasing in HLU .
I now turn to the standard deviation measure of dispersion. Using (25) we can write:
Since for the same good there is no variation in (α,β,λ) :
This suggests a positive correlation between SDP which is the cross sectional standard deviation of ln(P) and the standard deviation of ln(ECU ) . Since (29) implies a linear relationship between the standard deviation of ln(ECU ) and SDU we expect a positive relationship between SDP and SDU .
In sum, under (1') and Z = 2 , there is a positive relationship between our measures of price dispersion and our measures of unit dispersion.
Shoppers and non-shoppers
I now show that a tradeoff between expected capacity utilization and price may arise in a UST type model that allows for a distinction between shoppers and non-shoppers that is in the spirit of Salop and Stiglitz (1977) , Shilony (1977) and Varian (1980) . In the model stores choose when to stock out. The highest price stores stock out when demand is at its highest possible realization. The second highest price stores stock out when demand is at its second highest realization. The lowest price stores stock out when demand is at its lowest realization.
Buyers arrive in batches. In batch i there are φΔ i shoppers and (1− φ)Δ i nonshoppers. They all see posted prices. The non-shoppers choose a store on the basis of its location and its posted price. They go to the store and buy D(P) units at the store's price P if the store is not stocked out. If the store is stocked-out they go home empty handed. (They may consume out of storage or buy a close substitute, but this is not modeled here). Non-shoppers may choose stores that post a relatively expensive price for two reasons. First the location of the cheap stores may not be convenient to some of them. Second, they know that stores with cheaper prices are more likely to get stocked out and they are willing to pay a price for minimizing the chance that they will go home empty handed. I assume that the fraction of the non-shoppers that go to market i (choose a store with the price P i ) is γ i where
Shoppers see availability in addition to posted prices. They go to the cheapest store out of all the stores that are not stocked-out. In a more realistic model getting the best possible deal requires some search: The shoppers will typically visit more than one store while non-shoppers visit a single store.
The amount sold by a store in market i is as follows. In state s < i it sells:
units to non-shoppers and nothing to shoppers. In state s ≥ i it sells
units to non-shoppers and φΔ i D(P i ) to shoppers. Since a store that posts the price P i stocks out in state i , the total amount available for sale is:
The expected capacity utilization in market i is:
Equilibrium is a vector (P 1 ,..., P Z ; ECU 1 ,..., ECU Z ) that satisfies (1'), (34) and
Thus in the proposed equilibrium there is a tradeoff between expected capacity utilization and price. Note that the standard UST equilibrium can be obtained as a special case in which φ = 1 and all buyers are shoppers. Under (34), ECU 1 = 1 regardless of γ 1 . Some restrictions on the parameters are required to insure that
We may assume that q i − q i+1 is sufficiently large or that γ i+1 γ i is sufficiently small.
IMPLEMENTATION
The positive correlation between price dispersion and unit dispersion is the main prediction of the above versions of the Prescott model. I assume that the relationship is linear as in (8) and start by adding a classical measurement error to the derived relationship between ln(HLP) and ln(HLU). I then add variables suggested by other models: The average price, total revenues and the number of stores that sold the good. The average price was used by Pratt et.al (1979) in an earlier study.
Sorensen (2000) used the purchase frequency and the average wholesale price. Here I have data only from the sellers' side and I therefore use aggregate revenues to capture the importance of the goods in the buyers' budget (aggregate revenues = aggregate spending). The number of stores that offer the good may be a proxy for monopoly power and is analogous to the number of airlines in the route used by Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) when studying price dispersion in the airline industry. I also use category dummies and size variables to capture the difference in the cost of not selling (or the value of inventories) across products.
I assume that the average (over weeks) of the log difference between the highest and the lowest price for good i , ln(HLP i ), is described by the following equation.
where b are parameters, ln(Re v) is the log of total revenues (over stores and weeks), ln(AvP) is the log of average price (averaged over stores and weeks), # Stores is the number of stores that sold the product, CD are category dummies ( CD j = 1 if product i belong to category j and CD j = 0 otherwise), SD are category specific normalized size measures and e is an error term. The size variables will be described later. They are included in the regression as a proxy for shelf space and the cost of trade delays.
Motivated by (13), I also ran (35) after replacing the range measures by standard deviations measures of dispersion. To get a sense of the effect of the sample exclusion on the result I study, in Appendix C, one week in detail. Indeed there is a difference between the sample of 8602 UPCs that were sold by more than 1 store during that week and the sample of 4537 UPCs that were sold by more than 10 stores. Relative to the larger sample, price dispersion in the smaller sample is lower. The correlation of price dispersion with the number of stores and with total revenues is also lower but still positive.
The focus on popular items is not unique to this paper. As was mentioned in and then add years and cities. But the results turned out to be robust to the choice of specification and sample and the paper got too long. It therefore seems that adding years and cities should be done in a different paper.
The summary statistics for the 3 samples used are in I also attempted to include proxies for the cost of not selling (1− β i ). As was said above 1− β represents the cost of delaying revenues, storage cost and depreciation. Ideally we would therefore like to have information on the shelf life of each UPC and the shelf space that it takes. It also matters whether the good needs to be refrigerated or not. In the data there is only a size measure that may serve as a proxy for "shelf space". But the size measures are not comparable across categories.
They are in terms of a fraction of a "regular pack" and the size of a "regular pack" is sometimes in units of volume (for example, rolls for toilet paper) sometimes in terms of square feet (100 square feet is the regular pack for paper towel) and sometimes in units of weights (the regular pack of beer is 288 oz). For this reason I constructed 18 "size dummy" variables. The "size dummy" for beer was constructed as follows. First I normalized the size of all the 56 UPCs in the beer category so that the largest size is 1. I then assigned the value of zero to UPCs that are not in the beer category and the normalized beer size to UPCs within the beer category. Similar treatment was applied to other categories. The last column in Table 1 Recall that HLP is an average over weeks and therefore the maximum HLP is lower than the maximum in a randomly selected week. For the week studied in Appendix C, about 70% of the UPCs have ln(HLP) less than 0.4 (HLP=1.5). The correlation between ln(HLP) and the number of stores is 0.34 and the correlation between ln(HLP) and the log of revenues is 0.27.
The correlations between the main variables in the 3 samples are in Table 2 .
The correaltions between the price dispersion measures ln ( weekly aggregate sales ln(HLU), the standard deviation of the log of aggregate sales (SDU), the average log difference between the highest and the lowest price ln(HLP) and the average cross sectional standard deviation of log prices (SDP). See the text for detailed definitions.
ESTIMATION
As described in the data section, I use two measures of dispersion: The range measure and the standard deviation measure. Here I report the results when using the range measures. The regressions that use the standard deviation measures are reported in Appendix D.
I start with running price dispersion on unit dispersion for categories with more than 50 UPCs and for the samples as a whole. As can be seen from Table 3 As can be seen the coefficient 0.082 is highly significant. This coefficient does not change much when we add other explanatory variables in columns 2-6 and it is in the range 0.078 -0.094. The elasticity reported in Table 3 is 0.095 suggesting that the estimated elasticity is not sensitive to the addition of the other variables. On the whole, the estimated elasticity of the range dispersion measure with respect to the unit dispersion measure is close to 0.1 and is not sensitive to adding variables to the regression. Table 5 reports the regression results when running (35) for each category with more than 50 UPCs. As in Table 3 and the combined sample of 04-05. The first column is the name of the explanatory variables. The 6 regressions include different combinations of the explanatory variables. Each column reports the coefficients of a different regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable in all 6 regressions is the average log difference between the highest and the lowest price. All 6 regressions have category dummies (17 + intercept) and 18 size variables. One star (*) denotes p-value of 5%, two stars (**) denote p-value of 1% and three stars (***) denote p-value of 0.1%. The main explanatory variable in regression 1 is the log difference between the aggregate number of units sold in the week of highest sales and the week of lowest sales (HLU). Regression 2 adds the average log of the price. Regression 3 replaces HLU with the log of total revenues. Regression 4 has both HLU and revenues. Regression 5 replaces HLU with the number of stores and regression 6 uses all the variables. Table reports the results of a regression that was run for each category separately in 3 different samples. The selected categories have more than 50 UPCs. The first column is the coefficient of the unit dispersion measure HLU, and the following 5 columns are the coefficients of the other explanatory variables.
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
To address possible endogeneity problems I use the combined sample with 104 weeks and compute the independent variables on the basis of the first 52 weeks and the dependent variable on the basis of the last 52 weeks. The results in Table 6 are similar to the results in Table 4 . I also ran a 2SLS regression using ln(HLU) that is based on the first 52 weeks as an instrument for ln(HLU) that is based on the last 52 weeks. The results in Table 7 show that this did not change the coefficients of the unit dispersion measure by much. This suggests that endogeneity is not a problem. 
Specification search
The specification (35) says that price dispersion is increasing in the ratio of the amount sold in the highest sale week to the amount sold in the lowest sale week. A more general specification may assume that price dispersion is increasing in the amount sold in highest sale week and decreasing in the amount sold in the lowest sale week. We can thus generalize (35) as follows.
(36)
The specification (35) is a special case of (36) that assumes: Table 8 provides the results when running (36). The coefficient of ln(L i ) is not significantly different from zero, thus supporting the specification (35). (11), where L is the amount sold in the lowest sale week. The first row is the regression results for the 2005 sample, the second row uses the 2004 sample and the third uses the combined 04-05 sample.
Unit surprise measures
The model assumes demand shocks. We should therefore take out a UPC specific seasonal element in aggregate demand. For example, the demand for cold drinks and hot dogs may be higher during the 4 th of July week.
To get a cleaner measure of demand uncertainty, I use U it−L to denote the aggregate number of units sold from good in week and ran the following regressions:
Note that in (37) there is only one lag of 52 weeks designed to capture seasonality. In (37') I added the most recent 3 lags. I then look at the difference between the highest and the lowest residuals from the regression and define
is the highest value of the residual in (37) and ε i L = min t {ε it } is the lowest value of the residual. I use (high-low residual unit) as a range measure of demand uncertainty. The residual standard deviation measure of uncertainty,
HLRU
I use the combined 04-05 sample with 324 UPCs to run (37)-(37') and get the unit surprise measures HLRU and SDRU . Table 9 replaces the unit dispersion measure in Table 6 with the residual range measure of demand uncertainty. The coefficients of HLRU are very similar to the coefficients of HLU in Tables 6 and 7 and are in the range of 0.103 to 0.114. The coefficients of the variables suggested by search theory are also in line with the previous estimates. Table reports the results of 4 regressions using the combined 04-05 sample. The dependent variable is the range price dispersion measure that is computed on the basis of the last 52 weeks of the sample. The explanatory variable HLRU is the residual unit dispersion measure obtained from (37'). The computation of Ln (Av. Price) and Ln (Revenues) are computed on the basis of the first 52 weeks in the sample.
Price surprises or just prices?
Price surprises are the residuals in a regression of prices on information available to the buyer before he gets to the marketplace, like the identity of the store and the date.
Should we attempt to explain the dispersion of price surprises, as in Lach (2002), or the dispersion of actual prices? The answer depends on the underlying model. To illustrate this point, let us consider an extreme case in which all prices are perfectly predicted by the identity of the store. In the Burdett-Judd (1983) model this is equivalent to the assumption that all buyers see all prices and this leads to a degenerate price distribution equal to the competitive price. In the UST model buyers see all prices and it does not matter whether they can predict prices ahead of their Price changes and temporary price changes When demand is and the marginal cost is flat, the equilibrium price distribution does not change over time and it can be maintained without price changes. We can therefore have equilibrium with extreme price inertia in which each store stick to a single price that is consistent with (1). But in the data controlling for store effect eliminates only about 15% of the price dispersion.
The excess amount of price changes may arise for various reasons. It is possible for example, that demand is not iid and the demand distribution changes over time forcing stores to make price changes. In Appendix B I assume increasing marginal cost and show that this is enough to generate changes in the equilibrium price distribution because changes in inventories cause changes in production and marginal cost. It is also shown by example that temporary price reductions occur whenever inventories are high and in a sense, sales are used to manage inventories. 8 Store effect
Different stores may provide different services. Kaplan and Menzio (2014) find that about 10% of price dispersion can be attributed to "store effect". Unfortunately, in the UST model (and in the Burdett-Judd model) it is difficult to distinguish between a 8 The distinction between sale prices and regular prices has been a major issue in the literature on price rigidity. See for example, Eichenbaum, Jaimovich and Rebelo (2011), Guimaraes and Sheedy (2011) and Kehoe and Midrigan (2010) . The distinction arises because the "menu cost" of a temporary price reduction seems less than the "menu cost" of a regular price change. As a result some researchers have chosen to remove sale prices and consider only regular prices. Here I include all prices (regular and sale) in the measure of price dispersion. One reason for this choice is that from the consumer's point of view sale prices matters because a large amount of purchases are done in sale prices. More importantly, this choice is consistent with the UST model. In the UST model there are no menu costs. Since sellers are indifferent about prices in the equilibrium range they can adopt various strategies. They may adopt for example an (S,s) type strategy which looks like temporary price reductions. See Eden (1994) and Head et al. (2012) for further analysis.
iid store that is indifferent among all prices in the equilibrium range but consistently chooses to be at the low price range to a store that is in the low price range because it provides low services. 9
In general, "store effect" captures both price inertia and services. Ideally we would like to capture only the services part but we can only estimate an upper bound on the services component. To do that, I used the 04-05 sample with 324 UPCs and 104 weeks and ran 324 regressions of price logs on store dummies.
(38)
Here i is a UPC index, j is a store index and t indexes the week. Note that the "store effect" is UPC specific. The reason is that product placement is important. A store can consistently place a specific UPC in a relatively visible location and another UPC in a place that is not easy to find. 10 I then replace the log of prices by the residuals from (38). Using notation that are similar to the "unit surprise" notation we have: Table 10 is 0.31. This is 6 percentage points less than the average log difference when not controlling for a store effect reported in the last row of the column ln(HLP). Similarly, SDPR it is the standard deviation of e ijt 9 The two possibilities are not easy to distinguish even in principle. The "quality" of the store may be judged by the variety of the product it offers and more generally, by the probability of a stock-out: At the same price, a buyer prefers a store that he can find everything that is on his shopping list. But according to our model, the probability of a stock-out is higher for a low price store. We should therefore think of a store quality as attributes like location, cleanliness, average length of the line at the exit and parking availability. 10 Kaplan and Menzio (2014) distinguish between "store effect" and "store specific good effect". The first is a measure of the average price of the basket of goods sold by the store relative to the average price of the same basket in other stores. The second is the average price of the specific good relative to the average price of other products sold by the store. Our store dummy captures both effects.
over stores ( j) in week t and SDRP i is the average of SDPR it over weeks. The last column in Table 10 , labeled "SDRP" is the average of SDPR i over all the UPCs in the category. The average standard deviation over all UPCs is 0.11 (in the last row of the last column). This is 2 percentage points less than the average standard deviation when not controlling for store effect.
The upper bound on the amount of price dispersion caused by difference in services is thus 16% (= 6/37) if we use the range measure and 15% (= 2/13) if we use the standard deviation measure. This is an upper bound because as I said before the reduction in the price dispersion measures due to removing the "store effect" may occur because of price inertia rather than difference in services. Table 11 is a correlation matrix that repeats the correlations in Table 2 for the 04-05 sample and adds the correlations with the new price dispersion measures that control for "store effects". As we can see the correlation between the "old" and the "new" measures is about 0.9. The correlation between the "new" measures ln (HLRP) and SDRP is 0.98 and is similar to the correlation between the "old" measures. What is striking is that the correlation between the unit dispersion measures and the "new" price dispersion measures is higher than the correlation between the unit dispersion measures and the "old" dispersion measures. For example, the correlation between SDU and SDP is 0.53 and this is less than the correlation between SDU and SDRP that is 0.62. This suggests that the "store effect" dummy captures some differences in services and not merely price inertia. Table 12 reports the results of running ln(HLRP) on ln(HLU). Comparing with the bottom of Table 3 , it reveals higher coefficients of ln(HLU). Table 13 is the results of running ln(HLRP) on ln(HLU) and other variables. Comparing these results to the bottom rows of Table 4 reveals that the coefficient of ln(HLU) is now higher and the coefficient of ln(avgPrice) is lower (higher in absolute value). Table 14 is the results of running the standard deviation measure SDRP on SDU and other variables.
Comparing these results with the bottom rows of Table D1 reveals that now the coefficient of SDU are higher and the coefficients of ln(avgPrice) are somewhat lower. Table 1 for the 05 sample. The last two columns are measures of price dispersion that control for a "store effect". The last row is the average across all the 324 UPCs. Table D1 with a different dependent variable.
QUANTITATIVE IMPORTANCE
We have seen that the coefficients of the measures of demand uncertainty are statistically significant and relatively stable across samples. To get a sense of the economic significance I ask what will be the average price dispersion in a hypothetical world in which there is no demand uncertainty and the aggregate amount sold per week is constant over time. Here I assume that the services provided are the same across stores. In Appendix E I consider the case in which services varies across stores.
I estimate the effect of eliminating demand uncertainty for an "average" UPC (that is for a UPC with the average unit dispersion and the average price dispersion). Table 15 The fifth column uses the logs while the sixth column uses the actual ratio (the antilogs). As we can see from the last column, the percentage reduction is between 41 and 48 percent. Table 16 focuses on the standard deviation measure of dispersion. The second column is the coefficient (C2) of SDU in a regression of SDP on SDU and other variables. The third column is the average SDP in the sample. The forth column is the hypothetical SDP calculated as: SDPH = SDP -C2*SDU, where SDU is the average in the sample. The last column is the estimated effect of demand uncertainty on price dispersion. As can be seen the elimination of demand uncertainty will reduce the standard deviation by 39-44 percent. Tables 17 and 18 repeat the hypothetical experiment after controlling for "store effect". In this case, the elimination of demand uncertainty will reduce price dispersion by 54 percent. (HLU) is the average of the log HLU in the data. In parenthesis are the calculation when using the lower and upper bound of C1. The fifth and sixth columns is the percentage decline in price dispersion. The fifth is the ratio of the log difference (lnHLP-lnHLPH) to lnHLP and the last column is the ratio of the percentage difference HLP-HLPH to HLP-1. In parentheses are the computation when using the lower and upper bounds of C1. Table D1 (upper and lower bounds in parenthesis). The third is the average SDP in the data. The fourth is the hypothetical SDP calculated as: SDPH = SDP -C2*SDU. The last column is the ratio of the difference SDP-SDPH to SDP. Table 14 . The third column is the standard deviation of the residuals taken from Table 10 . The fourth column is the hypothetical standard deviation calculated as SDRPH = SDRP -(C2)SDU = 0.051 where SDU is from Table 10 . The last column is the percentage reduction in the standard deviation that will follow the elimination of demand uncertainty.
Using the results in Appendix E we may say that eliminating demand uncertainty will reduce the standard deviation measure of "true" price dispersion by more than 54 percent. This is a big effect.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In Prescott (1975) I extended the standard UST model to the case in which each of the hypothetical markets is monopolized by a chain. I also attempted a distinction between shoppers and non-shoppers. These extensions demonstrate that the relationship between demand uncertainty and price dispersion is robust.
Consistent with the theory, I find that price dispersion is increasing in measures of unit dispersion. To check for robustness, I include in the regressions three variables suggested by search and discrimination theories: The number of stores that sell the good, total revenues from selling the good and the average price of the good.
The inclusion of the additional variables does not change the unit dispersion coefficient by much. This coefficient is about 0.1 when using the range measures of dispersion, and about 0.15 when using the standard deviation measures of dispersion.
Out of the additional variables used, the average price is the only one with a stable and significant effect. As in Pratt et. al. (1979) , higher average price reduces price dispersion.
The effect of demand uncertainty on price dispersion has economic as well as statistical significance. Our estimates suggest that eliminating demand uncertainty will on average, reduce the cross sectional standard deviation of the price log by more than 50%.
